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Aug 16

Written by: Diana West
Friday, August 16, 2013 10:37 AM 


  1. On opening, the National D-day Memorial in Bedford, Virginia—a town that lost more Americans per capita on D-day than any other—unveiled busts of FDR, Truman, Churchill, Chiang Kai-shek, and Stalin. Stalin’s inclusion sparked anger, editorials, a petition, and, finally, board action to remove all of the leaders from public display. -stalin-other-allied-fi-ar-530016/.

  2. Suvorov, Chief Culprit, xi.

  3. Bohlen, Witness to History, 126.

  4. Suvorov, Chief Culprit, xi.

  5. Suvorov, Chief Culprit, xiii.

  6. Dies, Martin Dies’ Story, 11.

  7. Gen. Mark W. Clark, Calculated Risk (New York: Enigma Books, 2007), 389.

  8. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports! 405–32.

  9. William C. Bullitt, “How We Won the War and Lost the Peace,” Life, August 30, 1948.

  10. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1948), 396.

  11. See, for example, Rafael Medoff, “The Roosevelt Administration, David Ben-Gurion and the Failure to

    Bomb Auschwitz,”

  12. Dallas, 1945, 413–14.

  13. Suvorov makes a compelling argument that the Soviets were caught off guard in an offensive position

    while preparing to strike at Germany themselves.

  14. “Chinese Ask Russia for Second Front,” New York Times, June 14, 1943.

  15. Notwithstanding the Soviets’ “secret” blitzkrieg in Mongolia in August 1939 that destroyed Japan’s 6th

    Army. See Suvorov, Chief Culprit, 114–20.

  16. Manchester, American Caesar, 241. Initially, army brass (including Marshall) and FDR found MacArthur’s proposal to bring Russia into the Pacific War persuasive; with Japan knocked out, all Allied forces could turn to captive Europe. FDR wired Moscow to convene a conference. “Stalin’s reply was cool. He pre- ferred, he said, to defer judgment on the matter until spring. Studying his reply, Marshall and Stark de- cided it would be unwise to press the issue.”

  17. Winston S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), 605.

  18. Schecter and Leona Schecter, Sacred Secrets, chapter 2, “Operation Snow,” 22–45.

  19. Niblo, Influence, 101. Niblo agrees with Adm. Edwin Layton that the Soviets probably knew of the attack given that the Japanese strike force, steaming toward Hawaii with instructions to sink anything in its path, permitted a Soviet-flagged freighter, Uritsky, loaded with Lend-Lease goods, to sail unharmed. Admiral Layton writes in “And I Was There”: Pearl Harbor and Midway, “This raises the probability that Uritsky’s course must have been given to the Japanese by the Russians themselves. This deduction then leads to the logical assumption that that Soviet intelligence knew precise details of the course to be take across the Northern Pacific by Nagamo’s striking force.” Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton, U.S.N. (ret.), with Captain John Pineau, U.S.N.R. (ret.), and John Costello, “And I Was There”: Pearl Harbor and Midway—Breaking the Secrets (Old Saybrook, CT: Konecky and Konecky, 1985), 221.

  1. Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, 37.

  2. Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, 44.

  3. Manly, Twenty-Year Revolution, 114.

  4. Baldwin, Great Mistakes of the War, 30.

  5. Manchester, American Caesar, 240, 270.

  6. Manchester, American Caesar, 279.

  7. Sherwood, Hopkins, 2:548. Sherwood writes, “In one convoy [to Murmansk] twenty-one out of thirty- three ships were sunk.”

  8. Transcript of Lend-Lease Act of 1941,

  9. Lyons, Red Decade, 240.

  10. McJimsey, Hopkins, 190.

  11. Sherwood, Hopkins, 1:400.

  12. Herring, Aid to Russia, 46.

  13. Sherwood, Hopkins, 1:449. Chesly Manly discusses this paradox in Twenty-Year Revolution, 114–15.

  14. Sherwood, Hopkins, 2:542.

  15. Writing in 1958, General Wedemeyer, a member of the first joint strategic planning group in early 1942, defended Marshall and rejected the notion that the “second front” was conceived with anything but Western interests at heart. “From my own knowledge I can state categorically that the BOLERO-ROUNDUP concep- tion was aimed at winning the war on preferential terms for the West. See Wedemeyer Reports! 153–54.

  16. “Drive in North Africa Not Enough,” New York Times, October 28, 1942.

  17. “Shock Troops Lead, Simultaneous Landings Made Before Dawn at Numerous Points,” New York Times,

    November 8, 1942; see FDR’s statement announcing “second front” at


  18. “Stalin Still Insisting on That Second Front,” New York Times, November 8, 1942.

  19. “Stalin Says Drives in Africa Turn War in Favor of Allies,” New York Times, November 14, 1942.

  20. Figures come from Mark Clark’s memoir, Calculated Risk, 290.

  21. Moran, Churchill, 155. According to Moran, it was at Tehran where Churchill first realized that “if he

    wanted to help the countries of Eastern Europe he must get there before the Red Army.”

  22. Sherwood, Hopkins, 2:790.

  23. Sherwood, Hopkins, 2:769. “During these days at Cairo, Hopkins formed a friendship with Charles E. Bohlen. . . . Hopkins asked him all manner of questions about the Soviet Union, and was surprised and impressed by the objectivity and lack of bias as well as by the considerable scholarship revealed in his an- swers . . . Hopkins subsequently persuaded the president to appoint Bohlen to a post in the White House where he would act as a liaison officer with the State Department . . .”

  24. Bohlen, Witness to History, 148.

  25. “Was Stalin (the Terrible) Really a Great Man? A Conversation with Averell Harriman,” Encounter, November, 1981, 24.

  26. Harry C. Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower: The Personal Diary of Captain Harry C. Butcher,

    USNR, Naval Aide to General Eisenhower, 1942–1945 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1946), 447–48.

  27. These Eisenhower quotations come from FRUS: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943 (published

    1961), 359–61.

  28. Baldwin, Great Mistakes of the War, 38–39. Eaker explained that from an air point of view it would be “easier to support a trans-Adriatic operation than the invasion of southern France. The bases, he pointed out, had already been established in Italy . . . But the southern France operation would have to be sup- ported from new bases in Corsica. After the meeting was over, General Marshall commented . . . to General Eaker: “You’ve been too damned long with the British.”

  29. See Moran, Churchill, for an eyewitness account of Hopkins’s Churchill-rage.

  30. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 198–200.

  31. Baldwin, Great Mistakes of the War, 56–57. “General Eisenhower’s own inclinations about Berlin apparently had the full support of Washington; Edgar Ansel Mowrer reports in The Nightmare of American Foreign Policy that he had been personally told by the White House that ‘the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Truman to let the Russians take Berlin.’ President Truman, new to the White House and without much background about the past nuances of our politico-military policies, apparently acceded.” Joint Chiefs = Mar shall. Marshall = Hopkins?

  32. “Allied Front in Italy Not So Far from Reich,” New York Times, September 12, 1943.

  33. Gannon, Cardinal Spellman Story, 224.

  34. Dunn, Caught Between Roosevelt and Stalin, 195–96.

  35. Clark, Calculated Risk, 203.

  1. “St. Exupery Lost on Flying Mission,” New York Times, August 10, 1944.

  2. Clark, Calculated Risk, 294.

  3. Dunn, Caught Between Roosevelt and Stalin, 196.

  4. Somehow Hopkins’s coaching of Molotov to circumvent American military advice didn’t make it into Sherwood. See Mark, “Venona’s Source,” 20.

  5. “Mr. Molotoff Came to Plead for a Second Front,” New York Times, June 13, 1942.

  6. Sherwood, Hopkins, 2:610.

  7. Sherwood, Hopkins, 2:615.

  8. Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, 90.

  9. Standley and Ageton, Admiral Ambassador, 271.

  10. “Our Indispensable Fronts,” New York Times, February 25, 1943.

  11. “Second Front Lag Is Denied By Knox,” New York Times, June 23, 1943.

  12. Moran, Churchill, 102.

  13. “Zero Hour,” New York Times, July 11, 1943.

  14. “Russians Cheer Landing as Aid to the Red Army,” New York Times, July 11, 1943.

  15. McJimsey, Hopkins, 299.

  16. Moran, Churchill, 142.

  17. Moran, Churchill, 140–42.

  18. FRUS: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943 (published 1961), 493.

  19. FRUS: Cairo and Tehran, 494. “Marshal Stalin said that he favored the operation in Southern France particularly as he thought Turkey would not enter the war. He repeated that he thought Turkey would not enter the war.” You better believe Turkey wouldn’t enter the war. Lord Moran tells us (157) that Churchill tried desperately to bring Turkey in. “Inonu had made it clear that it is Russia, not Germany that the Turks fear. They fear that if Russians come to their assistance they will remain; once the Kremlin has her troops in command of the Straits, only force will displace them.”

  20. Clark, Calculated Risk, 293–95.

  21. Sherwood, Hopkins, 2:775.

  22. From Sherwood, Hopkins, 1:202–3: “Columnist Marquis Childs wrote: Should the President on a dull day suggest casually to his friend and confidant Harry L. Hopkins that the national welfare would be served if Mr. Hopkins were to jump off the Washington Monument, the appointed hour would find Mr. Hopkins poised for the plunge. Whether with or without parachute would depend on what the President seemed to have had in mind. Mr. Hopkins would know about that, because he has made a career of understanding, sensing, divining, often guessing—and usually guessing right—what is in Franklin Roosevelt’s mind. It is a career that has taken him from the dull routine of social-service work to the upper reaches of diplomacy, where he has had a thrilling preview of the shape of things to come. And, what is more, history may show that he was one of the shapers.”

  23. Sherwood, Hopkins, 2:775.

  24. Manly, Twenty-Year Revolution, 121.

  25. Sherwood, Hopkins, 2:783.

  26. Bohlen, Witness to History, 148.

  27. FRUS: Cairo and Tehran, 563–64.

  28. Sherwood, Hopkins, 2:788. On December 1, 1943, the last day of the conference, the Prime Minister put in a final plug for an assault on Rhodes and Hopkins went into smack-down mode. In fact, as Sherwood writes, “Hopkins was so anxious to have the record straight that he wrote his own version of his comments for inclusion in the minutes,” disowning Churchill’s remarks every way possible: “It should be clearly un- derstood that the American side believe that there are no landing-craft available for an attack on Rhodes— and, more important, still, that even if the landing-craft were available—no decision has been reached as to whether or not the landing craft could not be used to better advantage in some other operation.”

  29. Moran, Churchill, 155.

  30. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports! 96.

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